Commission distinctive. We ask whether Juncker views his EP mandate as giving him license to head a Commission that is ambitious than those headed by his predecessor, José Manuel Barroso. We provide empirical raw material for theorising about the EU, particularly given the prominence of the new intergovernmentalism as a theoretical paradigm of European integration. We argue that it is time to redefine the term 'intergovernmental', especially given how the Commission has become more directly linked to and dependent on EU national capitals in a time of acute crisis.
1 I am grateful to Elizabeth Bomberg, Megan Dee, Liesbet Hooghe, Renke Deckarm and three anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts, as well as attendees at presentations made at the 2015 EU Studies Association conference (Boston), the Center for Transatlantic Relations (Washington DC), Princeton University, and the Politics and IR Research Seminar (Edinburgh). Special thanks are due to 19 officials who granted interviews in January, July and October 2015 that yielded the original data set on which the article draws. The main bases for interviewee selection were 1) seniority, 2) nationality (officials of 10 different nationalities consulted); and representation of different elements of the Commission. Posts held by interviewees were: chefs (5), deputy chef (1) , , Directors (4), Heads of Unit (4), Secretariat-General (2) as well as (1) official in the EU External Action Service.
It comes as no surprise that many recent works on the European Union (EU) focus on 'crisis'.
1 By late investigation as is possible of how Juncker got the job, organised his College, and how it operates.
Above all, we explore whether Juncker's designation of his as a different kind of Commission is a response to a new intergovernmentalism that (paradoxically) has seen EU member states embrace 'integration without surpanationalization' (Bickerton et al 2015: 39) and has revealed them to be 'deeply reluctant to cede further powers to the Commission' (Bickerton et al 2015: 5) since the 1992
Maastricht Treaty gave birth to today's European Union.
We begin by considering where the Commission stood when Juncker became President (section 1 below). The way in which the Juncker Commission was constructed and how it now operates are then investigated (section 2). We consider the multiple possible meanings of 'political Commission' (see section 3). The Commission's prospects (section 4) in an EU dominated by a 'seemingly hegemonic Germany' (Dinan 2015: 93) are then considered, particularly in light of the theoretical claims of the new intergovernmentalism. Our conclusion reflects on the fate of both the Commission and the EU amidst enormous political turbulence, and how theory might explain practice.
From Prodi to Barroso to Juncker
Debate about the Commission's standing has featured prominently in the EU research literature since the entire College of Commissioners resigned under Jacques Santer's Presidency in 1999 (see Hodson   2013 ; Kassim et al 2013: 130-50; Wallace and Reh 2015) . What often goes unappreciated is how the Commission's weakness at that moment became a shared concern of all EU stakeholders. Two examples illustrate.
The first was the Berlin European Council's decision, just over a week after Santer's resignation and after 10 minutes of discussion, to appoint Romano Prodi, the first former Prime Minister of a large EU state (Italy) to become Commission President. Previously, Prodi had earned political respect for assembling a centre-left coalition that defeated Silvio Berlusconi's alliance in the 1996 Italian election.
His government then succeeded in restoring Italy's economic health to the point where it joined the Euro, a goal previously viewed as unreachable.
Prodi's subsequent tenure (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) as Commission President was hardly an unambiguous success.
Officials who served under him rated his performance only marginally stronger than that of Santer (see Kassim et al 2013: 165) . Still, Prodi's prioritisation of administrative reform of the Commission (Schön-Quinlivan 2011), with former UK Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock piloting root and branch change, endeared him to European leaders. 3 Prodi also helped shift the debate on enlargement to the point where a previously hesitant European Council opened accession negotiation with no fewer than 12 applicant states. Whatever our verdict on Prodi, restoring the position of the Commission was widely-viewed as vital after Santer's fall.
Another example further illustrates how an effective Commission is considered a European public good. The proposal by the 2002-3 Convention of the Future of Europe (in its draft Constitutional Treaty) to reduce the size of the College to make it more efficient embraced an idea that originated in the 1979 Spierenburg report (see Kassim et al 2013: 208) . A smaller College was viewed by Dirk Spierenburg -a former member of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (the Commission's precursor) -as less compartmentalised, with fewer, larger policy portfolios better coordinated. Spierenburg's injunction was subsequently ignored. Yet the size of the Commission became 'one of the most passionately debated' issues in all (5) intergovernmental conferences held to consider EU treaty change in the post-Maastricht period (Piris 2010: 226) . The Treaty of Nice (2001) mandated that 'the number of Members of the Commission should be less than the number of Member States' once the EU had enlarged to 27 or more. Vaguely, the Treaty signalled that 'a rotation system based on the principle of equality' would then come into effect. An early assessment of enlargement's effect on the Commission asked whether the very meaning of 'intergovernmentalism' had to be rethought. Enlargement implied 'more complicated bargaining and coalition-building, which in itself might actually make the position of the Commission stronger' (Peterson 2008: 775) . A Commission with -to put it benignly -one main access point per national capital might end up less autonomous but more integrated into the EU's institutional system.
Barroso's response to an enlarged College was to run a highly centralised Commission. Soon after his appointment, Barroso warned of the dangers of 'fragmentation' or 'Balkanisation' of the College (Kassim et al 2013: 166) . He then then used his cabinet (of personal advisors) to keep a grip on the policy agenda. The role of the Secretariat-General -responsible for servicing the College, linking it to the permanent services (Directorates-General; DGs), and overseeing coordination -was transformed.
In the past, the 'Sec-Gen' was a mostly neutral arbiter. Under Barroso it became almost an extension of the President's cabinet and enforcer of his agenda. When surveyed in 2008, a clear majority of
Commission officials -nearly 60 per cent -agreed with the statement: 'The Secretariat-General is becoming more political and influential in the life of the Commission' (Kassim et al 2013: 194) .
Yet, another possible illustration of new intergovernmentalist constraints was how Barroso's
Commissions were judged as unambitious (see Hodson 2013) . His claim that 'the basic legitimacy of our Union is the member states' tarred him with the brush of intergovernmentalism. As Juncker replaced Barroso, a typical comment on the latter's legacy was: 'a period in which the Commission lost influence in the face of member states and failed to set the agenda' (Keating 2014a 
Constructing the Juncker Commission
The nomination of Juncker via the Spitzenkandidaten system was, by itself, enough to politicise his Presidency as none ever before. The EP's political groups interpreted the Lisbon Treaty as a mandate to put forward candidates for the Commission's top job, and then for the European Council to choose the Spitzenkandidat whose group won the 2014 EP election. Opposition to Juncker personally (too much of a 'federalist') and to the method by which he was chosen was led by the UK's David Cameron, under pressure from his increasingly eurosceptic Conservative party. Cameron seemed to find support from Germany's Angela Merkel, who initially agreed to consider other candidates ('anything is possible' 6 ) and signalled that the prerogative of the European Council to choose the Commission President should be preserved. So did the premiers of Hungary and Sweden (and, by some accounts, the Netherlands). 
The influential philosopher Jürgen Habermas told Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that if the European
Council 'were to suggest someone else as a leading candidate, it would be a bullet to the heart of the European project. In that case you couldn't expect any citizen to ever involve themselves in a Besides, Mogherini offered balance prioritised in any share-out of EU jobs, in terms of gender and large v. small states, as well as qualifications and competence, as she subsequently showed (see below).
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Juncker designated the same number of Vice-Presidents as Barroso (7) Juncker's limited influence over national selections allowed him to disclaim responsibility for loading the College with members of his own political family. But several nominations caused him political headaches. One was Cameron's choice of (Lord) Jonathan Hill, a backroom operator in the UK Conservative party who was almost unknown even in his own country. Cameron lobbied for Hill to be given a major portfolio and Juncker assigned him the financial services brief of cardinal importance to the City of London. MEPs gave Hill a rough ride, hauling him back for a second confirmation hearing after he was lacklustre in his first. Subsequently, however, Hill was nodded through with the proviso that enforcing EU rules on bankers' bonuses (challenged by the UK in the European Court of Justice)
would be assigned to the Czech Justice Commissioner, Vĕra Jourová.
Then there was Slovenia's Alenka Bratušek, who nominated herself for the Commission during her final days as Prime Minister after losing her party's leadership. Her self-nomination had failed even to find majority support in her own cabinet, forcing her to use special rules of procedure allowing absent ministers to be counted as voting in favour. Nonetheless, Juncker made Bratušek Vice President for Energy Union and defended her as a former premier who had saved her country from an EU bail-out. 16 He thus did himself no favours when Bratušek gave a dreadful performance in her Juncker was bold in seeking to solve the problem of an overlarge College, but by no means was he the first to try. Santer created 6 'Groupes de Commissaires' to coordinate related policies, but they took no actual decisions and merely exchanged information. Prodi could claim some credit for a 'strange and complicated formula' (Piris 2010: 228) what does it mean to be a political Commission? And was Juncker's intent to reassert the Commission's autonomy in the face of new intergovernmentalist constraints in the modern EU?
A 'Political' Commission?
An early reaction to Juncker's political Commission came from Barroso, who damned the idea with faint praise: 'I think the Commission has to be -and mine was -a political body. But it should not be a politicised or partisan body. I think the Commission should remain a political body, but my advice is to avoid partisan lines of fracture and polarisation' (quoted in Keating 2014a).
Plausibly, Juncker's vision may have followed from his selection via the Spitzenkandidaten system, which he claimed gave him more legitimacy and his College a mandate. But one senior Commission official poured scorn on these notions:
Juncker has a very party political agenda. The Spitzenkandidat was a very bad idea. Our mandate lacks legitimacy…We are confusing political messaging with our policy role. We have become too party political…we need to be more evidence-based, and a party political agenda is the opposite of that. Nevertheless, senior officials were upbeat about the first half of the Juncker Commission. One head ('chef') for a portfolio Commissioner's cabinet noted:
A star chamber chaired by Timmermans has cut lots of proposals; more than ever before. Finally, we've got someone asking 'why are we doing this'?…We need a slimmed down agenda on jobs and growth, with every portfolio geared to how we get more. A political Commission means we're going to look at what is politically necessary and possible…We're going to focus on 2 or 3 political priorities.
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The verdict of a top official in the Secretariat-General was emphatic:
It's a revolution in the way the Commission is run -in a good way…previously, we had 27 portfolios all working in isolation. Another senior official insisted:
I actually do think stressing the political agenda gives us more legitimacy. I don't personally believe in the Spitzencandidaten system, but it means the Commission can defend itself from its detractors…For example, in our assessments of the Italian, French and Belgian budgets, we treated them in a more flexible and thus political way, and not purely mechanically. Barroso couldn't do that because he lacked the legitimacy that Juncker has.
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The new formula also provided Juncker flexibility to allocate dossiers to ensure neutrality. One of the Commission's Directors-General (most senior permanent officials) was even-handed:
I'm favourable to the VP system: it is a bold experiment that obviously depends on good will, but things were too 'siloed' before. 4-5), specifically to the Commission? As ever, a lot will depend on factors beyond the Commission's control.
One is the leak of 28,000 pages of confidential documents detailing tax deals that were cut between large multinationals and Luxembourg while Juncker was Prime Minister of the Duchy. Juncker insisted Luxembourg's tax authority had acted on an 'autonomous basis', but conceded that he was 'politically' responsible. With Luxembourg already under investigation by the Commission for sweetheart deals with Fiat and Amazon, Juncker promised new EU legislation to make such tax affairs more transparent.
But one senior Commission official spoke for many in concluding: 'this could harm all of us…Juncker might say the wrong thing about it some day when he's being flippant or is angry. It could be a disaster'. had to present it to the media even though he had nothing to do with it'. 37 Meanwhile, Timmermans' role suggested that delegation to VPs was strictly limited: 'to say he's the most powerful VP isn't saying much. They're mostly being used to sell [Commission] initiatives….Martin has "done" Greece himself and he will "do" BREXIT [the UK's demands for reforms] himself'. based on a 'pro-integration consensus that has had to be institutionally shielded from growing public disenchantment with public policy outcomes' (Bickerton et al 2015: 37 ).
An audit of how the Commission's evolution fits with the hypotheses of the new intergovernmentalism (Peterson 2015) , let alone a critique of the paradigm's credibility more Second, considerable evidence suggests that new intergovernmentalist delegation has not weakened the Commission. A study of budget surveillance and banking union finds the Commission 'more proactive than much of the literature suggests', and rejects any loss of its 'influence, authority, initiative and effectiveness…quite the contrary' (Savage and Verdun 2016: 114) . Meanwhile, the Commission and de novo agencies have formed 'tight relationships', colluded in task expansion where the Commission previously was weak, and produced 'a centralization of EU executive power' (Egeberg et al 2015: 609-10) . Even in social policy, entrepreneurship by the Commission has 'considerably strengthened its oversight and constraining powers' but in 'a new form of hybrid governance that combines political intergovernmentalism and technocratic supranationalism' (Crespy and Menz 2015: 765).
The latter point suggests a need to redefine 'intergovernmental'. Credibly, the supranational v.
intergovernmental dichotomy describes a debate that reached its height during the Delors era, and is now confined to the past. A paradigm shift in the way the EU works may well have occurred post- (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016: 55) .
CONCLUSION
We have ranged widely in investigating what may be distinct about the Juncker Commission. We can be confident about some things: his is the most explicitly political Commission ever, the new VP system is a radical departure, and the College's links to national capitals are more direct. We also have evidence to sustain three more general points.
The first reflects but also extends beyond Juncker. The EU appeared to equip its institutions with A final point is theoretical. Our ability to describe, explain and predict the evolution of European integration using theories from the past is challenged by how unprecedentedly crisis-ridden the EU has become. The new intergovernmentalism 'does not claim to be a new grand theory of regional integration' (Bickerton et al 2015: 45) , but its hypotheses shed important light on the Commission or at least encourage us to investigate it in novel ways. To illustrate, Hartlapp et al (2014) portray the Commission as very much a political actor as well as a system that both influences and is influenced by a diverse array of political currents. Perhaps it has always been so. Now -by necessity -the Commission is more in the thick of political debates that have potentially profound consequences. To influence these debates and push for political solutions, it by definition must be more closely linked to national EU capitals and accept that its days as an 'engine of integration' are over. Finally, we might conclude that the Commission -and EU more generally -are adapting, or at least trying to do so, to previously unimaginably difficult circumstances. The performance of Juncker's political Commission is likely to go far towards determining Europe's political future.
